VICTIM BLAMING IN LIGHT OF STRAWSON’S NATURALISTIC THEORY OF MORALITY
DOI 10.51634/2307-5201_2023_1_16
УДК 340.1; 17.03
ГРНТИ 10.01.33; 02.51.25
V.V. Honcharov,
PhD in Law, Associate Professor,
Department of Legal Theory
and Philosophy of Law at
Ivan Franko National University of Lviv
(Lviv, Ukraine),
e-mail: Адрес электронной почты защищен от спам-ботов. Для просмотра адреса в вашем браузере должен быть включен Javascript.
The relevance of the topic of this paper is due to the insufficient study of the influence of Strawson’s naturalistic theory of morality on modern jurisprudence and philosophy of law. This comprehensive paper explores Peter Strawson’s naturalistic theory of morality, delving into the phenomena of victim blaming and its ancient roots in mythological contexts. It begins by assessing Strawson’s fundamental works, “Freedom and Resentment” (1962) and “Social Morality and Individual Ideal” (1961), elucidating how human emotional attitudes and moral accountability underpin society’s moral fabric.
The subject of the study is to analyze the ways of using moral argumentation and its boundaries in justifying the phenomena of victim blaming. The purpose of the work is to theoretically examine the connection of victim blaming within modern societal attitudes to ancient mythologies, revealing a profound enduring narrative thread. The novelty of the topic is due to the lack of studies in the educational and scientific literature on the specifics of the argumentation of victim blaming in modern legal philosophy, the need to rethink traditional ideas about the philosophical grounds of the criminal law, especially how the belief in divine will and a deity’s alignment with the perpetrator of violence, embedded within archaic societies, resonates within the victim blaming paradigm. By examining the concept of sacrifice in both well-known and obscure myths, the paper explains the purposeful nature of victimhood, and its societal implications. It further evaluates the philosophical and cultural dimensions of violence in archaic societies, deconstructing how violence was considered divine in such contexts. The intersection of victim blaming and moral responsibility is then examined, particularly how they influence societal attitudes and legal frameworks.
The research methods characteristic of analytical jurisprudence, including those related to the use of methods of logical and linguistic analysis, as well as special legal methods (formal legal method of interpretation of regulatory prescriptions) were used.
The paper concludes with a synthesis of these insights, reflecting on their implications for understanding Strawson’s naturalistic theory of morality. It offers significant conclusions about the complex relationships between morality, victim blaming, and societal norms, emphasizing the theory’s utility in comprehending the nature and impacts of victim blaming.
Keywords: naturalistic theory of morality, victim blaming, violence, moral responsibility, archaic societies, mythology, Peter Strawson.
Introduction
The concept of morality has long been a topic of intrigue among philosophers. Peter Strawson, an influential English philosopher, offered a distinctive viewpoint regarding morality in his works “Social Morality and Individual Ideal” (1961) and “Freedom and Resentment” (1962). In these influential pieces, Strawson presents a compelling naturalistic approach to morality, a perspective that is inherently entwined with human nature and emotions
Strawson rejects the conventional dichotomy of determinism and free will, asserting that our practices of moral judgment are underpinned by our natural human responses of attitudes and emotions, specifically “reactive attitudes” such as resentment, gratitude, and forgiveness. As R.J. Wallace remarks, Strawson’s approach focuses on the interpersonal nature of these reactions, which form the bedrock of moral responsibility.
In “Social Morality and Individual Ideal”, Strawson explores the necessity of a shared social moral framework for human coexistence. He argues that while the framework is not immutable, it is also not completely malleable to individual ideals. This implies a delicate balance between societal expectations and personal ideals, a point further explored by R. Forst.
Basic provisions
Analysis and Reflections. Critics of Strawson’s perspective argue that it bypasses the crux of moral responsibility which is whether an individual could have acted differently in a given circumstance. However, advocates such as M. McKenna counter that Strawson’s theory aligns with our natural disposition to attribute responsibility based on displayed attitudes rather than hypothetical scenarios.
Strawson’s approach helps unravel the intricate dynamics between society and individuals. While the traditional consequentialist and deontological theories (I. Kant) provide a guideline for moral actions, Strawson emphasizes the inherent societal and emotional dimensions that drive moral judgments.
The applicability of Strawson’s theory in real-life scenarios, such as criminal justice, is examined by G. Watson who highlights the emphasis on reformative justice over retributive measures.
Strawson’s account also interplays with moral psychology, particularly with the theories on moral sentiments of philosophers like D. Hume, and recent empirical studies carried out in the field (J. Greene; J. Haidt). The intersectionality of these ideas underlines the significance of a multidisciplinary approach in understanding morality.
Strawson’s naturalistic theory of morality offers a fresh lens to interpret moral responsibility, positing it as a complex interplay of societal norms, interpersonal relationships, and emotional responses. It continues to incite debates among philosophers, lawyers, and psychologists alike, underlining its timeless relevance and depth (D.K. Nelkin; D. Pereboom).
While Strawson’s theory may not offer definitive answers to all moral quandaries such as victim blaming, which we address hereinafter, it provides invaluable insights into our shared moral experience as inherently social and emotional beings, reaffirming the relevance of a naturalistic account of morality in our understanding of the human condition.
On victim blaming. The phenomenon of victim blaming is a prevalent social issue wherein the victims of a crime or any wrongful act are held entirely or partially responsible for the harm they’ve suffered. This paper seeks to explore this issue in light of Peter Strawson’s naturalistic account of morality.
Victim blaming can take many forms, ranging from casual remarks to systemic practices embedded in legal, societal, and institutional settings. While many researchers (W. Ryan; M. J. Lerner) have highlighted the detrimental effects of victim blaming, its roots in the moral framework as articulated by Strawson provide a more profound understanding.
Materials and methods
During research the works of outstanding philosopher and theorist Peter Strawson, as well as other scientific literature on the problems of theory and philosophy of law were used. In paper research methods characteristic of analytical jurisprudence, including those related to the use of methods of logical and linguistic analysis were used.
Research results
1. Divine Will and Victim Blaming. Violence in the Archaic World
In many ancient cultures, the belief in divine determinism was paramount, often leading to the interpretation that victims were fated to suffer due to the will of the gods (E. Dodds). This notion implies that the perpetrator is merely an instrument of divine will, thus shifting blame onto the victim. W. Burkert posits that such an idea fundamentally aligns the divine with the oppressor, a disturbing alignment that sustains the act of victim blaming.
The archaic world was characterized by a different interpretation of violence. Violence was seen not merely as an aberration, but as a god-sanctioned, or at least god-tolerated phenomenon (R. Girard). In such a context, the victim is seen not as a person wronged, but as part of a divine scheme (J.-P. Vernant), further justifying victim blaming.
Archaic societies often revered violence as a divine tool of transformation and authority (M. Eliade). The physical act of violence was perceived as a manifestation of divine intervention, often sanctifying the act and its aftermath. This sacralization of violence, a peculiar cultural construct, normalized and justified violent actions.
In Archaic cultures, violent acts were often seen as tools of divine justice. Mythologies across the globe depict gods using violence to uphold justice or maintain cosmic order. The Greek myth of Zeus punishing Prometheus for stealing fire for humans is a classic example. Here, violence was seen as necessary and just, ordained by divine authorities.
Violence also served as a means of power and control in Archaic societies. The Spartan society’s militaristic culture, rooted in brutal training and harsh discipline, stands as an example of this aspect. The celebration and institutionalization of violence helped maintain the societal hierarchy and control over the populace.
Archaic cultures often displayed a concerning alignment of the divine with the perpetrator, implying the victim was part of a divine scheme. Victims of violence were considered chosen by gods, suggesting a divine purpose or destiny in their suffering. This perspective furthered the notion that violence was god-sanctioned, thereby negating empathy for the victims.
The notion of sacrifice or being a victim is a recurrent theme in mythologies across the globe. Prometheus, known in Greek mythology as the one who sacrificed his well-being to bring fire (knowledge) to mankind, is a prominent example. Additionally, lesser-known tales like the Inuit myth of Sedna, who was sacrificed by her father and became the goddess of marine animals, highlight that the concept of sacrifice always carries a purpose. The act of sacrifice was seen as a necessary loss for a greater good.
These mythological underpinnings of sacrifice being purposeful tie in with victim blaming. The suffering of the victim is seen as a necessary precondition for a larger divine or societal good. The implication is that the victim’s suffering was ordained and meant to serve a greater purpose, thereby justifying the harm they experienced.
Understanding the deep mythological roots of victim blaming provides a lens to critically examine this practice. The ancient notions of divine will, god-sanctioned violence, and purposeful sacrifice offer insights into how victim blaming has been entrenched in societal behavior. Nevertheless, it is imperative that we evolve beyond these archaic perspectives and cultivate a more empathetic and fairer stance towards victims.
2. Victim Blaming in Light of Strawson’s Moral Framework
Strawson’s account posits that our moral judgements are inherently tied to our natural human responses of attitudes and emotions, specifically, “reactive attitudes” such as resentment, gratitude, and forgiveness. This framework can explain the phenomenon of victim blaming. M.J. Lerner elucidates that victim blaming often arises from our natural, albeit misguided, reactive attitudes – an attempt to maintain the illusion of a just world.
Further, Strawson’s argument for the necessity of a shared social moral framework sheds light on how societal norms and biases influence our tendency to blame victims. Biases ingrained in social norms, as critiqued by R. Forst, can distort our moral judgement, leading to victim blaming.
The practice of blaming victims has deep roots in mythological narratives. In these narratives, victims were often seen as necessary sacrifices for a greater good or subjected to violence as a divine mandate. The fate of victims, hence, was considered justified, often shifting the blame away from the perpetrator and onto the victims.
Moral responsibility, traditionally, is the obligation to act rightly and refrain from acting wrongly. It encompasses both individual actions and their societal implications. Therefore, in cases of violence, moral responsibility should ideally fall upon the perpetrator. However, the practice of victim blaming disruptively shifts this responsibility.
The intersection of victim blaming and moral responsibility materializes when the burden of preventing or enduring violent actions falls on potential victims rather than the ones committing these actions. A mythologically reinforced belief that victims have a role in their victimization allows this responsibility shift.
This intersection poses a serious challenge to societal justice. By blaming victims, we subtly absolve perpetrators of their moral responsibility. Not only does this skewed perspective undermine the suffering of the victims but also indirectly reinforces the cycle of violence, thereby perpetuating societal harm.
Victim blaming and moral responsibility intersect in ways that disrupt societal balance and justice. Challenging and changing this deep-seated narrative requires understanding its origins and consciously reframing our perspectives. It is not an easy path, but it is one that must be undertaken to promote empathy, justice, and a better understanding of moral responsibility in society.
Exploring victim blaming within Strawson’s framework prompts a reassessment of how we attribute moral responsibility. Strawson advocates a practical viewpoint where moral responsibility attribution is based on the natural human propensity to respond to others’ attitudes. From this viewpoint, victim blaming could be seen as a misguided attribution of responsibility driven by a desire to uphold societal norms or personal biases.
Moreover, Strawson’s notion of moral responsibility based on reactive attitudes rather than hypothetical scenarios lends a new perspective to victim blaming discourse. It urges a focus on the attitudes displayed by the perpetrator rather than speculative debates on the victim’s actions.
Strawson’s naturalistic account of morality provides a rich framework for understanding the roots of victim blaming and prompts a critical reassessment of our reactive attitudes and shared moral framework. In this way, Strawson’s perspective contributes to the broader discourse on victim blaming and underscores the need for a continuous dialogue to challenge harmful societal norms and promote empathy and understanding.
Ultimately, addressing victim blaming requires more than legal remedies; it requires a deep understanding of our shared moral framework and a commitment to challenge the ingrained biases and attitudes that perpetuate it. In this regard, Strawson’s naturalistic account of morality provides a powerful tool for engaging with this critical social issue.
Discussion
Understanding the social dynamics of victim blaming, moral responsibility, and violence is crucial to disentangling the complexities of societal responses to violent incidents. This paper brings together diverse strands of thought, exploring these phenomena’s roots in archaic mythologies and their impact on contemporary societies.
Victim blaming is not a contemporary construct; it dates back to mythological narratives where victims were often seen as necessary sacrifices for the greater good or suffering due to divine dictates. These narratives shift the blame away from the perpetrators, a legacy we still grapple with today. These patterns can be discerned from the myth of Prometheus to lesser-known myths across the globe.
Moral responsibility is traditionally the obligation to act rightly and refrain from acting wrongly. However, victim blaming disrupts this fundamental principle, subtly shifting responsibility from perpetrators to victims.
Violence in the archaic world was often portrayed as pleasing to the gods. It served as an instrument of divine retribution or as a ritualistic offering, making it a significant aspect of archaic societies. Victims were considered chosen by the gods, their suffering destined, and any opposition was seen as defying the divine will.
The intersection of these three concepts presents a convoluted view of societal justice. Victim blaming allows the shifting of moral responsibility, creating an environment conducive to violence.
The consequences of this intersection are profound. They not only undermine the justice system but also indirectly fuel the cycle of violence. The skewed perception perpetuates societal harm, undermining the suffering of victims, and often prevents them from seeking justice.
Conclusion
The naturalistic moral theory proposed by Peter F. Strawson offers a substantial framework to better understand the link between morality and victim blaming. To grasp this connection, we must first comprehend Strawson’s moral philosophy which centers on our reactive attitudes and their role in shaping our moral judgments.
Strawson contends that our natural, emotional responses to the actions and attitudes of others lay the groundwork for moral responsibility. By viewing our moral assessments as an intrinsic part of our emotional lives, Strawson asserts a naturalistic approach to morality, grounding it in our lived experiences and emotions such as resentment, gratitude, forgiveness, and blame. This perspective contrasts sharply with the more abstract, principle-driven theories of morality which tend to view moral judgments as the result of rational deliberation and decision-making.
Applying Strawson’s naturalistic moral theory to the issue of victim blaming brings us to confront the emotional underpinnings of this phenomenon. We blame victims due to a variety of emotions: fear of acknowledging our vulnerability to similar harms, discomfort at confronting injustice, and the desire to uphold societal norms or personal beliefs, among others.
From Strawson’s perspective, these emotional reactions are not just incidental to our moral judgments – they are the foundation of those judgments. They provide the impetus for us to attribute responsibility, and when directed towards victims, they shape our impulse to blame. As such, Strawson’s theory helps elucidate the emotional basis of victim blaming.
Moreover, Strawson’s emphasis on the interplay of emotional responses and moral judgments offers insights into how societies may begin to dismantle victim blaming. By acknowledging the emotional roots of this practice, we can start to address them directly, challenging and changing our emotional responses to victims. Education, public discourse, and narratives that elicit empathy for victims, for instance, could all contribute to shifting societal attitudes and mitigating victim blaming.
Yet, understanding the emotional roots of victim blaming is just one part of the equation. Strawson’s theory also underscores the role of societal norms and expectations in shaping our emotional responses. Hence, addressing victim blaming requires a broader examination of social structures and cultural narratives that perpetuate harmful norms and stereotypes.
Overall, Strawson’s naturalistic theory of morality serves as a potent lens through which to investigate victim blaming, providing a framework to understand its emotional underpinnings and societal roots. The challenge for future research and advocacy lies in using this knowledge to foster societal attitudes and structures that support victims, rather than blame them.
Our understanding of morality and victim blaming, when viewed through the lens of Strawson’s naturalistic moral theory, creates a compelling call to action: to strive for societal change, both at the emotional and structural level, to eradicate the pervasive problem of victim blaming.
В.В. Гончаров, к.ю.н., доцент кафедры теории и философии права Львовского национального университета имени Ивана Франко (г. Львов, Украина): Обвинение жертвы в свете натуралистической теории морали Питера Стросона.
Актуальность темы настоящей статьи обусловлена недостаточной изученностью влияния натуралистической теории морали Питера Стросона на современную юриспруденцию и философию права. Это всестороннее исследование затрагивает натуралистическую теорию морали Питера Стросона, углубляясь в явления обвинения жертвы и его древние корни в мифологических контекстах. Оно начинается с оценки ключевых работ Стросона, «Свобода и обида» (1962) и «Социальная мораль и индивидуальный идеал» (1961), разъясняя, как человеческие эмоциональные отношения и моральная ответственность лежат в основе моральной ткани общества.
Предмет исследования заключается в анализе способов употребления моральной аргументации и ее границ при обосновании феномена обвинения жертвы. Цель работы состоит в теоретическом рассмотрении связи обвинения жертвы в современных общественных отношениях с древними мифологиями, обнаруживая глубокую, устойчивую нарративную нить. Новизна темы обусловлена отсутствием в учебной и научной литературе исследований о специфике аргументации в отношении обвинения жертвы в современной философии права, необходимостью переосмысления традиционных идей о философских основаниях уголовного права, особенно о том, как вера в божественную волю и согласие божества с насильником, встроенное в архаические общества, находит отражение в парадигме обвинения жертвы. Исследуя понятие жертвоприношения как в хорошо известных, так и в малоизвестных мифах, работа освещает целенаправленный характер жертвенности и ее общественные последствия. Также в статье дополнительно оцениваются философские и культурные измерения насилия в архаических обществах, разбирая, как насилие считалось божественным в таких контекстах. Исследуется взаимосвязь обвинения жертвы и моральной ответственности, особенно как они влияют на общественные отношения и правовую сферу. В качестве методов исследования применялись методы, характерные для аналитической юриспруденции, в том числе связанные с применением методов логического и лингвистического анализа, а также специальные юридические методы (формально-юридический метод толкования нормативных предписаний).
Работа заканчивается синтезом этих взглядов, отражая их последствия для понимания натуралистической теории морали Питера Стросона. В статье предложены и обоснованы значимые выводы о сложных отношениях между моралью, обвинением жертвы и общественными нормами, подчеркивая полезность теории в понимании природы и воздействия обвинения жертвы.
Ключевые слова: натуралистическая теория морали, обвинение жертвы, насилие, моральная ответственность, архаические общества, мифология, Питер Стросон.
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